

Hacktivism

Information Privacy with Applications David Sidi (dsidi@email.arizona.edu)




Administration

- Server Assignment II: Simple Cracking
 - tmux

Threat modeling, again again: Dataflow diagrams

- what is securedrop?
- let's look at my demo securedrop instance, p4rxz5ngh3w7qoj7.onion
- On to the diagram!



Switching gears: "Hacktivism"



Introduction

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The Information Era has only recently come of age; powerful database technology has become more affordable to implement (witness MCI's ability to maintain a database of the people you most frequently call for participation in its Friends & Family program), and parallel to it, information gathering has become more extensive and more scrutinizing. After weapons manufacturing, and drug running, "information gathering" is probably one of the most profitable enterprises in America.

Over the past two decades, credit bureaus, telephone companies and direct marketers have collectively amassed complete consumer profiles on over 150 million Americans. But for the most part, this information has been used only to predict consumers' future buying habits, or worse: to influence them. For billing and marketing purposes, up-to-date address and telephone information, as well as information about your household has been incidentally maintained.

But, until recently, none of this information was COMMERCIALLY available IN A SINGLE DATABASE, specifically with law enforcement, private-investigators, bounty-hunters and lawyers in mind. To our knowledge, Information America is the first accessible service to make use of previously collected data for the expressed purpose of providing the up-to-date whereabouts, personal profiles and information regarding legal entanglements (i.e., bankruptcy filings, lawsuits, etc.) of as many Americans as possible.

 what is the story of Laird Brown's role in cDc?



The Chris Tucker, Laird wasn't coming from nowhere. He was building on the politicization that had been expressed most dramatically earlier in 1996 by the Electronic Frontier Foundation's John Perry Barlow, a libertarian Republican. While a party had raged on around him during the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Barlow had read that an over-the-top attempt to ban web porn had just been signed into law in America as part of telecom legislation.

"Alongside the changes on the streets, the internet was rapidly transitioning from an apathetic communications medium into a demos—a people with a shared culture, shared values, and shared aspirations. It had become a place where history happens, a place people identified with and even felt they came from."





How can I explain it, to someone who wasn't there? My younger readers, with their younger standards, might think of the nascent Internet as way too slow, the nascent Web as too ugly and un-entertaining. But that would be wrong. Back then, being online was another life, considered by most to be separate and distinct from Real Life. The virtual and the actual had not yet merged. And it was up to each individual user to determine for themselves where one ended and the other began.

It was precisely this that was so inspiring: the freedom to imagine something entirely new, the freedom to start over. Whatever Web 1.0 might've lacked in user-friendliness and design sensibil-

ity, it more than made up for by its fostering of experimentation and originality of expression, and by its emphasis on the creative primacy of the individual. A typical GeoCities site, for example, might have a flashing background that alternated between green and blue, with white text scrolling like an exclamatory chyron across the middle-Read This First!!!-below the .gif of a dancing hamster. But to me, all these kludgy quirks and tics of amateur production merely indicated that the guiding intelligence behind the site was human, and unique. Computer science professors and systems engineers, moonlighting English majors and mouthbreathing, basement-dwelling armchair political economists were all only too happy to share their research and convictions-not for any financial reward, but merely to win converts to their cause. And whether that cause was PC or Mac, macrobiotic diets or the abolition of the death penalty, I was interested. I was interested because they were enthused. Many of these strange and brilliant people could even be contacted and were quite pleased to answer my questions via the forms ("click this hyperlink or copy and paste it into your browser") and email addresses (@usenix.org, @frontier.net) provided on their sites.

As the millennium approached, the online world would become increasingly centralized and consolidated, with both governments and businesses accelerating their attempts to intervene in what had always been a fundamentally peer-to-peer relationship. But for one brief and beautiful stretch of time—a stretch that, fortunately for me, coincided almost exactly with my adolescence—the Internet was mostly made of, by, and for the people. Its purpose was to enlighten, not to monetize, and it was administered more by a provisional cluster of perpetually shifting collective norms than by exploitative, globally enforceable terms of service agreements. To this day, I consider the 1990s online to have been the most pleasant and successful anarchy I've ever experienced.

What makes a life? More than what we say; more, even, than what we do. A life is also what we love, and what we believe in. For me, what I love and believe in the most is connection, human connection, and the technologies by which that is achieved. Those technologies include books, of course. But for my generation, connection has largely meant the Internet.

Before you recoil, knowing well the toxic madness that infests that hive in our time, understand that for me, when I came to know it, the Internet was a very different thing. It was a friend, and a parent. It was a community without border or limit, one voice and millions, a common frontier that had been settled but not exploited by diverse tribes living amicably enough side by side, each member of which was free to choose their own name and history and customs. Everyone wore masks, and yet this culture of anonymity-through-polyonymy produced more truth than false-hood, because it was creative and cooperative rather than commercial and competitive. Certainly, there was conflict, but it was outweighed by goodwill and good feelings—the true pioneering spirit.

You will understand, then, when I say that the Internet of today is unrecognizable. It's worth noting that this change has been a conscious choice, the result of a systematic effort on the part of a privileged few. The early rush to turn commerce into e-commerce quickly led to a bubble, and then, just after the turn of the millennium, to a collapse. After that, companies realized that people who went online were far less interested in spending than in sharing, and that the human connection the Internet made possible could be monetized. If most of what people wanted to do online was to be able to tell their family, friends, and strangers what they

were up to, and to be told what their family, friends, and strangers were up to in return, then all companies had to do was figure out how to put themselves in the middle of those social exchanges and turn them into profit.

This was the beginning of surveillance capitalism, and the end of the Internet as I knew it.

- Who are the Hong Kong Blondes?
- Phineas Fisher,
  Guccifer 2.0,
  Shadow Brokers:
  the role of
  outside influence
  on hacktivism
- Group privacy is powerful; it can attract efforts to coopt



toward our integrated session: obfuscation and standoff biometry